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INTRODUCTION

West Virginia, like the rest of the country, is facing growing
problems with the release of toxic substances into the environment.'
Recent studies have shown high levels of toxicity in the state's air,2
on its land surface, 3 and in its groundwater These toxic agents cause
serious health problems.5 Those who are injured from exposure to
toxic substances due to the negligence of others deserve to have their
injuries compensated through the judicial system.
The difficulty of applying common-law remedies in toxic tort
cases is well documented. 6 Common-law remedies were developed in

1. A "toxic" substance is one that is capable of acute or chronic injury to humans
or the environment. KATHLEEN A. TOUBY ET
DESKBOOK 265 (1989).
2.

AL., THE

ENVIRONMENTAL

LITIGATION

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CHEMICAL STUDIES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-

TION AGENCY, AIR POLLUTION AND RESPITORY HEALTH IN THE KANAWHA VALLEY OF
WEST VIRGINIA: A SUMMARY OF PHASE III FINDINGS AND AN UPDATE OF THE PHASE II

RESULTS (on file with author). This study shows a high rate of respitory problems for children in the third to fifth grades from Kanawha County due to their exposure to 19 volatile
organic compounds commonly found in the Kanawha County atmosphere.
3. West Virginia has four hazardous waste sites on the National Priorities List created by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
commonly known as "CERCLA" or "Superfund" Act. A site is placed on the list by virtue
of the EPA developed Hazard Ranking System. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AOENCY,
NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST SITES: WEST VIRGINIA (1990) [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA NPL
SITES]. West Virginia also has approximately another 500 sights in which the EPA is monitoring for possible severe toxic risks. Telephone Interview with Lew Baker, Site Inspector
and geologist with the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, Office of Waste
Management (Sept. 14, 1992).
4. The toxic substances at three of West Virginia's superfund sites have contaminated
the groundwater. WEST VIRGINIA NPL SITES, supra note 3, at 3-9.
5. Even a low level of exposure can cause, among other problems, dimness of sight,
slowing of healing from cuts, hearing and speech impairment, impaired memory, lethargy,
and abdominal pain. See -David W. Schnare, The Pale Light of Science: Examining the
Toxicology of Low-level Exposures, in CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION AND ITS VICTIMS 22, 29
(David W. Schnare & Martin T. Katzman eds., 1989).
6.

ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER AT AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,

LAW, AND SOCIETY 182-98 (1992); Frances C. Whiteman, Toxic Emotional Distress Claims,
The Emerging Trend for Recovery Absent Physical Injury, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 995 (1991);

Allen T. Slayel, Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J 849, 850-56 (1988); Note, The Inapplicability
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order to allow plaintiffs to recover for injuries that were immediately
apparent and easily understood.7 For example, if one person injures
another while driving drunk, the elements of negligence, namely, duty,
breach of duty, causation, and injury, are easily satisfied.' In toxic tort
cases, however, the injuries usually have long latency periods and
scientific understanding of how these injuries occur is limited.9 These
characteristics of toxic exposure injuries cause the plaintiff great difficulty in recovering damages.1"
The exposed party's primary difficulty is showing causation."
Because of long latency periods and the complexity of the cancer
developing process, plaintiffs have difficulty showing that certain
chemicals were the legal cause of specific subsequent injuries." Often
a plaintiff must rely upon statistical relationships which show what
percentage of times a person similarly exposed will be similarly in13
jured, and this is not always enough for recovery.
Even when the plaintiff can show causation, other difficulties
remain. The long latency period between exposure and injury increases
the probability that the negligent actor or actors may be missing, bankrupt, or without the financial resources to pay the claim. 14 Additionally, the complex nature of proving a toxic injury often makes the cost
of litigation prohibitive.1 s The difficulties for plaintiffs in showing

of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Victim Compen-

sation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 576-78 (1983).
7. For a discussion tracing tort law from ancient common-law claims arising from
"trespass" and "action on the case" to intentional acts and negligence, see W. PAGE
KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs 28-30 (5th ed. 1984).
8. ld. at 164-65.
9. Latency periods are the length of time between contact with a chemical and a
body reaction. For example, the time between exposure to radiation and the detection of
internal organ cancers is often twenty years. TOUBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 261; see also
PLATERET AL., supra note 6, at 182, 184-85; Slayel, supra note 6, at 850-52.
10. See Slayel, supra note 6, at 852-53; Note, supra note 6, at 580.
11. TOUBY ET AL., supra note 1, at 105; PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 182, 185.
12. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 185-89; Slayel, supra note 6, at 852-54.
13. PLATER ET AL., supra note 6, at 190-92; Slayel, supra note 6, at 853-54.
14. Slayel, supra note 6,at 855.
15. Id.at 856-57.
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causation, and in recovering once causation is shown, create serious
social problems.
The first problem caused by these difficulties is the failure to
compensate people who are injured through no fault of their own. This
inequity is exacerbated in West Virginia because so many people cannot afford the necessary treatment. 6 The lack of legal remedy and
the inability of the injured persons to afford medical treatment often
accelerates the victim's health problems. 7 This situation, courts have
noted, violates fundamental justice. 8
The difficulty of recovery for victims of toxic exposure also harms
society as a whole. If manufacturers and users of toxic substances do
not have to pay for their negligence and the harm they inflict, they are
less likely to change their actions. 19 Negligent unlawful polluters of
toxic substances should be made to suffer an economic loss for their
behavior which will deter future harm. The West Virginia court system
should fashion sufficient legal remedies to protect the interests of the
individual and the society.20

16. Approximately 250,000 West Virginians do not have any health insurance at all.
There has never been a study to show how many West Virginians are underinsured, but it
is probably at least as many as have no coverage at all. Interview with Pat White, Chairperson of the Health and Human Services Committee of the House of Delegates and member of the Governor's Task Force on Health Insurance (Sept. 22, 1992).
17. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text (discussion of whether early detection helps cancer victims).
18. Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).
19. For a discussion on the use of tort law as a disincentive for wrongful behavior,
see RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 122-25 (discussing Judge L.
Hand's negligence formula); id. at 125-26 (the economic impact of allowing the defense of
"customary practice"); id at 142-43 (the economic impact of punitive vs. compensatory
damages) (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 25-26.
20. There will be a "Toxic Use Reduction" bill presented in the House of Delegates
and Senate of the West Virginia Legislature in the 1994 session. The primary purpose of
the bill is to reduce the use of toxic substances, not to increase the rights of those who
have been exposed to toxic substances. However, plaintiffs' legal rights will be aided by the
passage of the bill because toxic exposure will be made a strict liability tort. Passage of the
bill is unlikely unless it is greatly "watered down." Interview with David Grubb, Executive
Director of the Citizens' Action Group, member of the West Virginia State Senate representing Kanawha County (May 16, 1993).
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This need for change is real. For example, in March of 1990, the
Army Corps of Engineers took possession of an industrial site in Eleanor, West Virginia, that was filled with toxic waste.21 Fortunately, the
Corps was able to discover and contain the problem before it became
a health hazard to the community.22 Consider what would have happened if no one had purchased or investigated the site. The toxic materials would not have been contained. If the town's water supply were
contaminated, consumers would have ingested the toxins in their drinking water. Given sufficient exposure, the citizens of Eleanor could
have reasonably expected an increased incidence of cancer in their
community. Residents would face years of fear and mental suffering as
they waited to see if their loved ones developed fatal diseases. They
would face years of extra medical expenses undergoing tests to detect
potential illnesses as soon as possible. None, however, would have an
adequate remedy for their injuries.
The problem of providing a judicial remedy for those injured by
toxic exposure is not unique to West Virginia. A growing number of
jurisdictions are meeting this problem by providing two immediate
causes of action for those exposed to toxic substances: the costs of
medical surveillance and the infliction of emotional distress. These two
causes of action allow injured people an immediate remedy, without
having to23 wait through the long latency period to see if a disease
develops.

This Note urges the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
to join the increasing number of jurisdictions that recognize these
causes of action for those who are exposed to toxic substances. It will
discuss the origin of recovery for medical surveillance costs as an
independent cause of action, demonstrate that this cause of action
meets all the elements needed to recover for negligence, show that it

21. UNITEr
STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ENGINEERING EVALUATION/COST
ANALYSIS (EE/CA) FOR REMOVAL AND TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED SOIL: THE FORMER
ACF INDUsTRIES, INC. SITE, RED HOUSE, WEST VIRGINIA 1 (1992) (on file with author).
22. L at 12-18.
23. The issue of whether toxic exposure victims should be allowed to reopen their
case if a disease subsequently develops is beyond the scope of this Note. See Note, Claim
Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second Suits, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1989 (1990).
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is consistent with decisions previously reached by the court, and discuss the usefulness of early detection. Then this Note will discuss the
development and the reasoning of the national and West Virginia
courts regarding recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress and show how allowing recovery for exposure to toxins is
consistent with prior case law.
II.

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE DAMAGES

4

Individuals exposed to toxic substances run a much higher risk of
developing health problems than the general population. 5 Recognizing
this fact, physicians often advise people so exposed to undergo periodic diagnostic testing in order to detect the first signs of illness. Since
these tests are often expensive, exposed individuals should be able to
recover the costs of the medical surveillance.
A.

The Origin of Medical Surveillance as an Independent
Cause of Action

The concept of allowing recovery for medical surveillance as an
independent cause of action has two, common-law precedents: the
"avoidable consequences rule," and recovery for future medical costs
to treat a present physical injury.26 Courts have, at times, based recovery for medical surveillance on the former, on the latter, or on
bt27

The "avoidable consequences rule" is a basic principle of damages. 28 It imposes an active duty on the injured person to take whatever
24. The term medical surveillance, medical monitoring, and medical screening have
been used interchangeably in court opinions and commentaries. The terms mean the process
of medical examinations and testing to determine if a person has developed a disease.
Norman J. Landau & Douglas K. Landau, Claims For Non-Physical and Non-Present
Injuries: Emotional Distress and Medical Monitoring Damages, in PREPARATION AND TRIAL
OF A ToXIc TORT CASE 327, 341 (Policy Law Institute ed., 1990).
25. See supra note 5.
26. Slayel, supra note 6, at 863; Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315

(5th Cir. 1986).
27. Id
28.

See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
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reasonable action is necessary to minimize damages. 29 Specifically, an
injured person is required to select a competent doctor and submit to
medical care and treatment.' ° Failure to do so results in a loss of any
recovery for suffering or disability that could have been avoided by
undergoing treatment.31 Since the plaintiff is under a duty to seek
medical care and the defendant's actions caused that duty to arise, the
plaintiff should be able to receive medical surveillance damages inflicted by the defendant.
Recovery for the future costs of medical treatment for a present
physical injury is also a well-established principle of damages.3 2 An
injured person may recover the reasonable and necessary future medical costs that are both reasonably certain to occur and are proximately
related to the defendant's negligence.33 Under this theory, the costs of
medical surveillance should be considered an injury and the injured
party should be compensated.
The infliction of medical surveillance costs was first recognized as
an independent cause of action in Friends For All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.' Friends involved an action by a group of
parents of adopted Vietnamese orphans whose airplane crashed while
leaving Vietnam. 5 The plaintiffs sued the airplane's manufacturer for
the future expense of medical surveillance, even though some of the
children had no present physical injury.36 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the district court's granting of partial summary judgment on the issue of medical treatment and
other fees and the issuance of an order requiring the defendant to set
up a fund to pay for these future expenses.37

(1935).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id at 128.
Id at 136.
Id
Id at 324.
Id
746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id at 818.
Id at 825.
Id at 816.
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In recognizing a cause of action for medical surveillance, the
Friends court demonstrated the presence all of the elements required
for recovery in a negligence claim.31 The court noted that an individual has an interest in avoiding the cost of expensive medical procedures.39 If an actor's negligence is the proximate cause of a person's
need to seek expensive diagnostic or other medical treatment, that
actor has violated that person's interest, thereby creating an injury.4"
The actor should thus be held liable for the damages inflicted-future
cost of medical treatment.41
Medical surveillance damages were first discussed in the context
of a toxic tort in Ayers v. Jackson Township.42 In Ayers, the citizen
plaintiffs sued Jackson Township for damages caused by its negligent
operation of the city landfll. 43 As a result of the negligence, toxic
chemicals contaminated the water supply for approximately six years
before being discovered. 4" The trial court gave the plaintiffs medical
surveillance damages that were made necessary by the defendant's
negligence.45
The internediate appellate court disagreed with the trial court's
holding on medical surveillance.4 6 This court held that the plaintiffs
could not recover for future medical costs without proving a present
physical injury or that a future injury was reasonably likely to oc-

38. Id at 825-27.
39. Id at 826.
40. Id The court noted that there is nothing "speculative" about this injury. Id Expert
medical testimony can be used to prove the plaintiff's need for medical examinations.
41. Id at 825.
42. 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1983), revd in part and affid in part, 493
A.2d 1314 (NJ. Sup. CL App. Div. 1985), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987). Other early cases accepting medical surveillance are: Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986); Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir. 1986); and Merry v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
43. Ayers, 461 A.2d at 186.
44. Id

45. Id
46. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1985). The court seemed to be confusing recovery of medical surveillance damages with
recovery for a future injury. They are not the same. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525
A.2d 287, 308, 309 (N.J. 1987).
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cur.47 Since the plaintiffs could not make this showing, the court did

not allow recovery."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the intermediate court's decision." The court recognized that victims of toxic
exposure will sometimes suffer significant but unquantifiable risk of
future disease which makes medical surveillance necessary and proper.5" The court also noted that requiring polluters to pay for the exposure victim's medical surveillance costs is good social policy: 5 the
requirement avoids the inequity of forcing a wrongfully exposed individual to pay for necessary medical expenses when she is unable to
prove that a future illness or disease is likely;52 it encourages early
detection and treatment, which is likely to lessen the physical harm to
the injured person; 53 and it acts as a deterrent by subjecting polluters
to liability when proof of the causal connection is likely to be the
most readily available. 54 For these reasons, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reinstated the trial court's award for future medical surveillance
costs.

55

B. Medical Surveillance in West Virginia
The only case in West Virginia discussing medical surveillance
payments as an independent cause of action is Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc. 56 In Ball, the plaintiffs tried to recover for the future medical expenses made necessary by their exposure while at work 57 The

47. 493 A.2d at 1323.
48. d
49. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
50. Id at 309.
51. Id. at 311.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 312; see also Cook v. Rockwell Int'l, 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991);
Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990, vacated on other grounds, 793
F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847
(M.D. Pa. 1988).
56. 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 38.
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, stating that West Virginia law
only recognized the payment of future medical payments if there was a
present physical injury." The Fourth Circuit refused to recognize
medical surveillance as a cause of action, in part, because the issue
has never been squarely presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia. 59 However the West Virginia Supreme Court has recognized the same common-law principles that have led other courts to
recognize medical surveillance as an independent cause of actionpayment for future injuries and the "avoidable consequences rule."
The case that best explains West Virginia's rule on the avoidable
consequences theory is Kaiser v. Hensley ° In Kaiser, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a circuit court's award of
$9,000 to an injured motorist as not inadequate.61 The court held that
a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff caused some of his own
injuries by taking too much aspirin (which caused a hernia) and that
this damage would have been averted if he had sought proper medical
treatment. 62 The court further noted that the test to determine whether
a plaintiff should have obtained medical care is based on what the reasonable person would have done under the same circumstances. 63
The rule in West Virginia regarding recovery of future medical
payments for a present physical injury is explained in Ellard v.
Harvey." West Virginia follows the national norm of allowing a
plaintiff to recover the reasonable and necessary costs of future medical treatment where the evidence shows that such expenses are both

58. Id at 39.
59. Id

60. 318 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 1983); see also Abdulla v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus
Co., 213 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1975) (admissibility of hospital bill as an item of special

damages, which is minimally tainted by extraneous charges, is within the sound discretion
of the trial court); Ellard v. Harvey, 231 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1975) (avoidable consequences
principle includes psychiatric complications); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1974)
(future medical damages must be reasonably necessary).
61. Kaiser, 318 S.E.2d at 603.
62, Id at 600.
63. Id
64. 231 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va 1976).
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reasonably certain to occur and that they are proximately related to the
negligent acts of the defendant. 65
These two common-law principles provide the basis for recognizing medical surveillance damages as an independent cause of action.
As the Friends court noted, the infliction of medical surveillance payments is itself a present injury that is both reasonably certain to occur
and is proximately related to the negligent acts of the defendant.6
Therefore, the future costs of medical payments should be allowed
under Ellard. Further, as the West Virginia court held in Kaiser, failure to undergo medical treatment that could prevent or mitigate the
disease would bar future recovery. Requiring injured parties to seek
costly medical care to protect their rights and not compensating them
for the expense of doing so is inequitable.
C.

Whether Medical Surveillance is Reasonably Necessary

The issue of medical surveillance hinges on whether early diagnosis and treatment helps those who have been exposed to toxic substances. If early detection of cancer or other latent diseases does not
benefit the exposed person, then the medical surveillance would not be
reasonably necessary. The answer to this question is not clear, but
most courts recognize the value of early detection. 67 For example, in
Ayers, the court noted that, "[h]ann in the form of increased risk of
future cancer attributable to delay in diagnosis and treatment has been
so widely accepted in the medical community that the existence of
such harm could be reasonably inferred from this professional common
knowledge., 6' This position is supported by the National Cancer Institute.' The Institute notes that estimates of the number of cancercausing deaths can be reduced
anywhere from three to thirty-five per70
detection.
early
to
due
cent

65. At at 342.
66. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
67. Slayel, supra note 6, at 867.
68. 525 A.2d at 311.
69.

NATIONAL CANCER INSTIUTE, THE USEFULENESS OF MEDICAL SCREENING (pam-

phlet) (on file with author).

70. Id
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A cancer patient's life expectancy depends on the size and location of the malignant tumors within the body. 7 1 The smaller the tumor and the more local the diseased area, the greater the chances of
recovery.' Once the tumor has grown large or the disease has spread
throughout the body, medical treatment is less likely to be successful." Thus, early detection is crucial when the cancer has attacked
one particular part of the body, but makes little difference in cancers
like leukemia that have no localized area. 74
However, disagreement over the usefulness of early detection does
exist.75 Some medical experts have written that cancer spreads so
quickly, by the time it is detected, treatment will not help the patient.76 This question is ultimately one that should be decided by the
trier of fact. A plaintiff must show that there is a need for the treatment and a jury must agree.77 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia should continue its tradition of prompt protection of the
rights of injured parties and recognize medical surveillance costs as a
cause of action.78 This cause of action contains all the necessary elements of a negligence claim and is based on common-law precedent

71. Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id
Id
Id
See Slayel, supra note 6, at 867-68; see also JOHN A. McDOUGALL,
MCDOUoALL'S MEDICINE: A CHALLENGING SECOND OPNION 27-28, 30, 41-42, 47-49
(1985).
76. McDouGALL, supra note 75, at 27-30, 41-42, 47-49. McDougall advocates spending the money on prevention and general wellness rather than on early detection and treatment.
77. Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
78. See, e.g., James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (recognizing causes
of action for wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy); Bond v. City of Huntington, 276
S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981) (allowing the recovery of prejudgment interest in wrongful death
cases); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979) (adopting doctrine of comparative negligence); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666
(W. Va. 1979) (adopting doctrine of strict liability in product cases); Lee v. Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (abolishing doctrine of parental immunity); Adkins v. St. Francis
Hosp., 143 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965) (abolishing charitable immunity for hospitals). In

many of these landmark decisions, the court overruled precedents which had been law in
West Virginia for many decades, while in others, it decided important questions of first impression without waiting for the legislature to act.
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long recognized in West Virginia. Finally, recognizing the cause of
action is good social policy. The great weight of medical evidence is
that early detection saves lives and reduces pain and suffering. Furthermore, requiring negligent polluters to pay for the harm they inflict will
place the loss on the party at fault.
Hm.

EMOTIONAL DISTREss DAMAGES

Allowing individuals exposed to toxins to recover only for the
cost of medical surveillance does not make them whole. Exposed individuals worry about developing cancer from the time they understand
the effects of their exposure until they die. These individuals can only
receive full compensation for their injuries if they are allowed to recover for their resulting emotional distress.
Prosser and Keeton define emotional distress as "all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." 9 Furthermore, to recover, the emotional distress must be "extreme" or "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it."' Finally, the distress must be "reasonable and justified
under the circumstances. " 1 The remainder of this Note will discuss
the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. It will
review the common-law development of this cause of action, describe
its development in West Virginia, present the theories adopted by other
states to allow recovery for this tort in toxic exposure cases, and finally, propose a rule for West Virginia based on its common law and the
reasoning of other state courts.
A.

The Common-Law Development of Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress

The leading American authority that developed the first rule for
recovery for mental anguish was Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.82 In

79. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 362.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
81. KEETON Er AL., supra note 7, at 362.

82. 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896). The court was following a precedent from England,
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Mitchell, the court held that injuries caused by mental anguish were
recoverable only if accompanied by a physical impact.13 It held that
injuries caused by emotional distress alone were too remote, and to
recognize them would allow a flood of litigation." Many courts followed Mitchell, usually basing their holdings on the need to guarantee
that the claim was genuine.' 5
Throughout the twentieth century, tort law has moved steadily
towards allowing greater protection to an individual's mental tranquility.86 In the century's first few decades, the physical impact requirement was criticized as being unfair and illogical.87 Courts strained to
avoid the rigidity of the impact requirement by allowing recovery for
emotional distress based on trivial impacts such as a "slight blow,"
"electric shock," or "dust in the eyes." 8 Increasingly, courts have
dropped the physical impact requirement. Instead, they have allowed
recovery for emotional distress if it was a result of, or resulted in,
physical injury or a physical manifestation of the mental injury. 89
The change in tort law did not stop there. The physical injury or
manifestation requirement has also been criticized as too rigid. 9° Recovery is sometimes allowed for people with obvious physical injuries
but feigned mental distress, but no recovery is allowed for those with
real mental injury but no physical one.91 As a result of this rigidity,
as well as advances in medical science that allow experts to distinguish between genuine and feigned mental illness, several states have
also eliminated the physical injury or manifestation requirement.9
These states allow recovery for mental anguish alone.

Victorian
83.
84.
85.

Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas 222 (Eng. 1888).
Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
Id.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 363.

86. Id. at 55.

87. See Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 n.4 (Va. 1973) (tracing the history of
the impact requirement).
88. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 363-64.
89. Id.
90. See Molein v. Kaiser Found. Hosp. 616 P.2d 813, 818-21 (Cal. 1980).
91. Id at 820.
92. Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67
WASH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1992). Whiteman, supra note 6, at 1013.
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Theories of Recovery for Emotional Distress From a Toxic Injury

The evolving standards for recovery of emotional distress damages
provide the toxic tort plaintiff with three potential theories of recovery:
first, some of the states that retain the impact requirement have found
the toxic exposure to be an impact, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to
recover;93 second, some states that still have the physical injury or
manifestation requirement have defined injury or manifestation so
broadly as to allow many exposed individuals to meet that requirement;' and third, the states that permit recovery for emotional distress without an injury, manifestation, or impact allow recovery if the
emotional distress is foreseeable and serious.95
1.

Recovery for Plaintiffs Based on the Impact of the
Toxic Substance

A few states retain the physical impact requirement as an indication of the genuineness of the emotional distress claim." Courts have
allowed recovery for emotional distress after finding an impact from
drinking contaminated water, 97 exposure to asbestos, 98 and being
doused with a toxic liquid. 9 After reviewing the previous impact cases, the Florida District Court of Appeal stated that "the essence of impact... is that the outside force or substance, no matter how large or
small, visible or invisible, and no matter that the effects are not immediately deleterious, touch[es] or enter[s] into the plaintiff's body."1 °
One example of recovery based on impact, albeit in a slightly
different context is Plummer v. United States.0 1 In Plummer, the
plaintiffs were prisoners held in a cell with another prisoner who had
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See discussion infra part III.B.1.
See discussion infra part III.B.2.
See discussion infra part III.B.3.
KEETON Er AL., supra note 7, at 331.
E.g., Laxton v. Orlkn Exterminating Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1985)
Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
Eagle-Pitcher,481 So. 2d at 526.
580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978).
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tuberculosis. 2 They sued for emotional distress damages based on
their fear of getting the disease."0 The Third Circuit reversed the trial court's holding that Pennsylvania law had rejected recovery on the
basis of a physical impact when it adopted the "physical injury
rule. ''l(M The higher court found that physical impact was still available as5 an alternate showing in addition to the physical injury require10
ment.
2.

Plaintiffs Who Show Physical Injury or a Physical
Manifestation of their Emotional Distress

Most jurisdictions still require a plaintiff to show a physical injury
in order to collect for emotional distress.' 6 Physical injury in this
context is a similar concept to physical impact,"° and is also used as
a guarantee of genuineness."' However, there is no universally accepted definition of a physical injury.1°9 Formulating a definition in
this area of the law is difficult because medical science has advanced
to the point where it has become harder to distinguish what is clearly
a "physical" injury from one that is strictly "mental" or "emotional."110 The difficulty of finding an appropriate definition of physical
injury is even more pronounced when the emotional distress has been
caused by exposure to toxic substances because exposed plaintiffs
rarely have the lacerations and contusions associated with the term
"physical injury.""' However, toxic exposure victims often can show

102. Id at 73.
103. I at 74.
104. lit
105. I at 74-77.
106. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 364.
107. For example, in Georgia, physical injury and impact are synonymous. Wells v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 297 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
108. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 364.
109. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 (1964) (defining injury as "the invasion of any legally protected interest of another"). Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778, 780
(N.C. 1906) (equating a "wrecked nervous system" with physical injury); Wilkie v. State,
779 P.2d 1280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (defining physical injury as any "physical deterioration").
110. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
111. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in tracing
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two types of physical injuries in toxic tort cases, and a few courts
have recognized the exposure itself as a "physical injury."
The first type of physical injury that toxic tort plaintiffs can demonstrate is a physical manifestation of their emotional fear. Some examples of the type of manifestations that courts have allowed to satisfy
the physical injury requirement are "sleeplessness" and "loss of appetite,"1 2 "prolonged depression,"11 3 and "state of shock."' 1 4 If
toxic tort plaintiffs can make similar showings of physical manifestations they will be able to recover for emotional distress.
The second type of physical injury plaintiffs may be able to show
is a genetic or "subcellular" injury. While the link between exposure
to toxic chemicals and disease is not completely understood, medical
science is discovering a connection between toxic exposure and damage to a person's immune system, chromosomes, and genes." 5 This
damage causes an enhanced susceptibility to disease." 6 As a federal
district court held in Werlein v. United States," 7 subcellular injuries
are no less "real" than other injuries. 18 It is for the trier of fact,
guided by expert testimony, to determine the genuineness of the physi-

cal injury."

9

Finally, some courts have considered the exposure to the toxic
substances itself a physical injury for the purposes of permitting a
recovery for emotional distress. In Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating
Inc.,120 the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a trier of fact

the injury process in toxic torts).
112. Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va. 1991).
113. Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
114. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 195 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1952).
AND

115. See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD ET AL., MONITORING Tim WORKER FOR EXPOSURE
DISEASE: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF

BIOMARKERS 39-70 (1990) for a discussion of the current state of genetic and biological
testing to determine exposure to toxins.
116. 1d
117. 746 F. Supp. 881 (D. Minn. 1990).
118. Id. at 901.
119. Id Other cases that have accepted subcellular injuries as sufficient for recovery
for emotional distress are: Anderson v. Grace, 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass. 1986);
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984).
120. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 11
1160,

WEST VIRGINIA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1143

could conclude that the plaintiffs suffered a physical injury when they
drank water with toxic contaminants for seven months, even though no
other physical injury or manifestation resulted. 2 1 The court upheld
the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's visit to a hospital was reasonably necessary; this fact was enough to show 2physical injury and to
indicate that the emotional distress was genuine. 7
3. ' Recovery for Plaintiffs Based on the Reasonableness of
Their Mental Distress Due to the Circumstances of
Their Toxic Exposure
Several states are now allowing recovery for emotional distress
based on its reasonableness in light of the circumstances that caused it.
This rational was used by the Fifth Circuit to allow recovery for emo23
tional distress in the case of Hagerty v. L&L Marine Services, Inc.'
In Hagerty, a Jones Act seaman was drenched by liquid chemicals
including benzene and other toxins due to a faulty crane lift.'2 The
plaintiff, with the help of a fellow employee, showered, changed
5
clothes and returned to work, only to be drenched a second time.'
Recovery for emotional distress was permitted even though the plaintiff
showed no prolonged physical manifestations of physical or mental
injury.12 6 The court found that the circumstances alone were suffi12 7
cient to. guarantee genuineness.

C. Recovery for Emotional Distress in West Virginia
West Virginia has followed the national trend toward liberalizing
the rules for recovery for emotional distress. The trend was first estab121. .Id at 434.

122. Id; see also Hagerty v. L&L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 n.1 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding, without explanation, that a man soaked with liquid toxic chemicals had

suffered "physical injury" eveh though he suffered only very brief manifestations of injury).
123. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986). Note also that the Larton court, cited Haggerty as
similar to the Tennessee cases in which plaintiffs were able to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress without a physical injury. Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 433-34.
124. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 316.
125. IR
126. Id at 318.
127. Id
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lished in Lambert v. Brewster.128 In Lambert, the plaintiff suffered a
miscarriage caused by the stress she felt seeing her father being beaten. The jury verdict of $500 for her emotional distress was set aside
by the circuit court, apparently because the defendant's actions did not
result in a physical impact with the plaintiff." 9 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court and reinstated the verdict, holding that an
impact was not required for recovery for emotional distress in West
Virginia.'" The court held that recovery would be allowed for a
physical injury which resulted from worry caused by the defendant's
wrongs. 131 The court acknowledged that mental stress could be
feigned, but valued the principle "that for every wrong there was a
remedy" more than it was concerned about a flood of fraudulent liti132
gation.
The court further discussed the rule for recovery for emotional
distress in Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co. 33 In Monteleone,
the trial court granted a judgment of $5,000 for the plaintiff's emotional distress caused when a snapped trolley cable hit her car and
shattered the windshield."M The court reversed and held that a plaintiff could only recover for emotional distress if it was the result of a
physical injury, or resulted in a physical manifestation of the mental
injury, or was brought about by a defendant's intentional act. 135
After the Monteleone decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
expanded the ability of plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress. It
recognized recovery for emotional distress resulting from the tort of
outrage, 136 retaliatory discharge, 37 and employment discrimination.13 In these cases, the court allowed recovery without any phys-

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

125 S.E. 244 (W. Va. 1924).
See id at 249-50.
Id.
I&
Id at 249
36 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1945).
I at 476.
I at 478-81.
Hatless v. First Nat'l Bank of Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
I
Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyes, 380 S.E.2d 238 (1989).
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ical injury. These causes of action fit within the Monteleone framework because the1 39
act causing the emotional distress is intentional rather than negligent.
Within the last few years, the Supreme Court has gone beyond
Monteleone, allowing for recovery for the negligent infliction of mental
distress without a physical injury or a physical manifestation of a
mental injury. The court allowed recovery for emotional distress
caused by negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body," °
and for negligent grave desecration.141 The circumstances surrounding
the negligent act, the court held, ensure the genuineness of these
claims. 42 The court held, in these two cases, that it was making exceptions to, rather than abandoning, the physical injury or manifestation requirement. Finally, in Ricottilli v. Summersville Memorial Hospital,43 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia completely
abandoned the rule in favor of the exception. It held that West Virginia courts no longer need to require a physical injury or physical
manifestation before allowing recovery for emotional distress.'"
Now, persons suffering from mental anguish can recover based on the
reasonableness of their condition in light of the circumstances which
45
caused it.'

Ricottilli was an appeal by the plaintiff from the lower court's
dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim. 46 The lower
court so held because the plaintiff alleged that she suffered emotional
distress, but she did not allege a physical injury or physical manifestation of her mental injury." The Supreme Court based its decision
to reverse the lower court on its previous holding in Whitehair v.
Highland Memory Gardens, Inc. 41 In Whitehair, the plaintiff recov-

139. E.g., Harless, 289 S.E.2d at 703.

140. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 $.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985).
141.

Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1989).

142. Id at 393.
143. 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1992).

144. Id at 635

145. Id
146. Id at 630.

147. I
148. Id
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ered for emotional distress caused by the defendant's mishandling of
the dead bodies of several of her relatives, even though she had no
physical injury of manifestation of her emotional injury.149 In these
so-called "dead body" cases, recovery is allowed when the facts indicate a high probability that the emotional distress is genuine.iS.° The
Ricottilli court held that this rule will be applied to any case where the
to show that the emotional damage claim is not
facts are "sufficient
' 151
spurious.
D. Applying the Ricottilli Principle to Toxic Exposure Cases
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not yet considered recovery for the fear of cancer or other latent diseases due to
toxic exposure.15 2 However, in the case of Johnson v. West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc., the court allowed recovery for a plaintiff
who had been exposed to the HIV virus." 3 In Johnson, the plaintiff,
a security guard at West Virginia University Hospital, was exposed to
the virus when he was bitten while trying to subdue an AIDS patient.15 4 Since AIDS is a latent disease, this case offers insight on
how the court will hold regarding recovery for emotional distress for
other "latent disease" cases.
The Johnson court still required a physical injury, but it foreshadowed the approach the Ricottilli court was to follow by its emphasis
on whether the plaintiff's fear was reasonable.1 55 The court affimned
the lower court's jury instructions which said that "the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his fear of contracting
the AIDS disease is reasonable under all the facts and circumstanc149. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 443 (W. Va.

1985).
150. Id
151. Ricottilli, 425 S.E.2d at 639.
152. The Fourth Circuit affimned a summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a
toxic exposure case because, at the time, West Virginia law still required a physical injury
to recover for emotional distress. Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 936 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.
1991).
153. Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (1991).
154. Id at 893

155. Id
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es." 156 The Supreme Court further noted that "[the court] pointed out
to the jury that the appellee could not recover emotional distress damages merely because he was bitten, but that his fear must be reasonable. The fact that the appellee in this case was actually exposed to
the AIDS virus goes to the reasonableness of his fear."15 The court
was apparently moving toward the reasonableness standard in Johnson
that it would adopt in Ricottilli.
Together, Ricottilli and Johnson show that a person exposed to
toxins or any substance that may cause a latent disease will be able to
recover for their emotional distress if their fear is reasonable under the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. In toxic exposure cases,
the court should balance the different factors that it has traditionally
used to indicate the genuineness of a claim-the circumstances surrounding the negligent act and the nature of the injury-to determine
whether a toxic emotional distress claim is genuine. Specifically, in
situations like Hagerty158 and Ayers,"59 where the impact from the
chemicals is direct and severe and the toxicity of the chemicals is
high, recovery for emotional distress is reasonable. A thorough review
of the circumstances surrounding the event plus the requirement for a
clear relationship between the impact and the emotional distress will
prevent fraudulent claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A fundamental theory of our common law is that there should be
a remedy for every injury.' 6* Plaintiffs who have been exposed to
toxic substances and live in fear of cancer or another disease have
been injured. That the same plaintiffs also need medical diagnostic
treatment which they may not be able to afford compounds the injury:
they feel greater emotional distress and also have less chance to fight
the disease once it is manifested. They should be compensated. Com-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id at 894.
Id
See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244, 249 (W. Va. 1924).
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etiology of toxic exposure illness and their
these factors cannot be used as an excuse for
becomes more complicated, our common law
phisticated as well.
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because of the complex
associated latency, but
inaction. As our society
must become more so-

There are two causes of action that the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia can make available to toxic exposure victims that
will allow prompt and fair redress of their injuries. The first is to
allow recovery for medical surveillance damages. This cause of action
is based on well-established common-law principles of damages and
satisfies all of the elements of a negligent tort. Its recognition would
benefit exposed individuals by making available medical screening
which would discover latent injuries at their first physical manifestation
thus increasing the life expectancy of the affected individuals. Further,
it would also benefit society as a whole by deterring polluters who
might otherwise suffer no penalty for the harm they inflict.
The second cause of action, emotional distress damages, is one
that the courts already recognize. The court should make this cause of
action available to victims of toxic exposure when the facts of the
case substantiate the genuineness of the claim. This cause of action
would compensate victims for real injuries while acting as encouragement for toxic substance handlers to be mindful of their standard of
care.
Andrew J. Katz
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